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Abstract
Decision making under uncertainty is one of the central tasks of artificial agents. Due to their simplicity and ease of specification,
qualitative decision tools are popular in artificial intelligence. Brafman and Tennenholtz [R.I. Brafman, M. Tennenholtz, An ax-
iomatic treatment of three qualitative decision criteria, J. ACM 47 (3) (2000) 452–482] model an agent’s uncertain knowledge
as her local state, which consists of states of the world that she deems possible. A policy determines for each local state a total
preorder of the set of actions, which represents the agent’s preference over these actions. It is known that a policy is maximin
representable if and only if it is closed under unions and satisfies a certain acyclicity condition.
In this paper we show that the above conditions, although necessary, are insufficient for minmax regret and competitive
ratio policies. A complete characterization of these policies is obtained by introducing the best-equally strictness.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty is one of the central tasks of artificial agents. Due to their simplicity and ease
of specification, qualitative decision tools are popular in artificial intelligence (see e.g. [1–3,7]).
Brafman and Tennenholtz [2] defined a model of a situated agent, where an agent is described by the set of her
local states and the set of actions. For the current purpose, we identify the agent’s local state as the set of states of the
world she deems possible. Therefore an agent can be defined as a pair (S,A), where S is the (finite) set of states of the
world in which the agent is situated, and A is the (finite) set of actions from which the agent can choose. The agent
ranks the set of actions in a total preorder based on her state of information (i.e. her local state).
This choice of ranking of actions is called a policy in this paper, which corresponds to the notion of generalized
s-policy of [2].
Note that this naive description of policy is space-consuming. Brafman and Tennenholtz proposed an implicit way
for specifying policies that uses value functions, where a value function assigns to each action-state pair a real value.
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ones: maximin, minmax regret, and competitive ratio. While maximin and minmax regret are
well known in decision theory [6], competitive ratio is popular in theoretical computer science [5].
Brafman and Tennenholtz [2] carried out an axiomatic treatment of these three decision criteria. They gave repre-
sentation theorems for maximin policies. As for minmax regret and competitive ratio, it is easy to see
that (i) a policy is minmax regret representable iff it is competitive ratio representable; (ii) each minmax
regret policy is maximin representable.
In this paper we first show by an example that, unlike what was claimed in [2, Theorem 5, p. 466], maximin
policies are not necessarily minmax regret representable. Then we find a necessary and sufficient condition,
called best-equally strictness, for a maximin policy to be minmax regret representable. Roughly speaking, this
condition allows the agent to adopt a value function which has the same best value for all singleton local states.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalizes the three qualitative decision criteria. Sec-
tion 3 gives an example that shows maximin policies are not necessarily minmax regret representable, followed
by a complete characterization of minmax regret (competitive ratio) policies. Conclusions are given in
Section 4.
2. Three qualitative decision criteria
A binary relation  is called a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive. A preorder  is total if x  y or y  x for
all x and y. For a total preorder , we define two associated relations ≺ and ≈ as follows:
x ≺ y ⇔ ¬(y  x)
x ≈ y ⇔ (x  y) ∧ (y  x).
Definition 2.1. [2] A policy for an agent (S,A) is a function ℘ that assigns to each local state X ⊆ S a total pre-
order ℘X .
In what follows, we denote ℘ = {℘X: ∅ 	= X ⊆ S}, and if no confusion can occur, we often omit the superscript ℘
in the notation ℘X .
A policy may also be implicitly prescribed by using a value function.
Definition 2.2. [2] A value function u assigns to each action-state pair a real value, i.e. u :A × S →R.
For convenience, we call a value function u :A × S →R positive if u(a, s) > 0 for all (a, s) ∈ A × S.
Given a value function u on A × S, we define the regret function regu :A × S → R as regu(a, s) =
maxa′∈A u(a′, s) − u(a, s). If u is positive, then we define the competitive ratio function cmpru :A × S → R as
cmpru(a, s) = maxa′∈A u(a′, s)/u(a, s).
Now, we can formalize the three qualitative decision criteria as follows.
Definition 2.3. [2] A policy ℘ = {X: ∅ 	= X ⊆ S} has a maximin representation if there exists a value function u
on A × S such that for any local state X and any two actions a, a′,
a ≺X a′ iff min
s∈X u(a, s) < mins∈X u(a
′, s). (1)
Definition 2.4. [2] A policy ℘ = {X: ∅ 	= X ⊆ S} has a minmax regret (competitive ratio, resp.) rep-
resentation if there exists a (positive) value function u on A × S such that the condition specified in (2) ((3), resp.) is
satisfied for any local state X and any two actions a, a′, where
a ≺X a′ iff max
s∈X regu(a, s) > maxs∈X regu(a
′, s), (2)
a ≺X a′ iff max
s∈X cmpru(a, s) > maxs∈X cmpru(a
′, s). (3)
Noticing that minmax regret and competitive ratio are very similar, the following result is clear.
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3. When does a policy have minmax regret representation?
Brafman and Tennenholtz [2] and Hesselink [4] gave representation theorems for maximin policies. This section
gives a representation theorem for minmax regret (competitive ratio) policies. Note that by Proposi-
tion 2.1 we need only consider minmax regret policies.
We begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. [2] A minmax regret policy is maximin representable.
Proof. Suppose ℘ is minmax regret represented by u¯. Set u to be the value function that is specified by u(a, s) =
−regu¯(a, s) = u¯(a, s) − maxa′∈A u¯(a′, s). For any local state X and any two actions a, a′, we have
a ≺X a′ iff max
s∈X regu¯(a, s) > maxs∈X regu¯(a
′, s)
iff min
s∈X −regu¯(a, s) < mins∈X −regu¯(a
′, s)
iff min
s∈X u(a, s) < mins∈X u(a
′, s).
This means ℘ is maximin represented by u. 
The following example shows, however, the inverse of the above proposition is not true.
Example 3.1 (A counter-example). Suppose S = {s, s′}, A = {a, a′}. Consider the following policy ℘ that is specified
as follows:
a ≈℘{s} a′, a′ ≺℘{s′} a, a ≈℘{s,s′} a′. (4)
℘ is maximin representable but not minmax regret representable (see Table 1). In fact, set u(a, s) = u(a′, s) =
u(a′, s′) = 0 and u(a, s′) = 1. Then ℘ is maximin represented by u. Suppose we also have a value function u¯
that minmax regret represents ℘. Write u¯(a, s) = p1, u¯(a′, s) = p2, u¯(a, s′) = q1, and u¯(a′, s′) = q2. Then by
a ≈℘{s} a′ we know max{p1,p2}−p1 = max{p1,p2}−p2, i.e. p1 = p2; and by a′ ≺℘{s′} a we know max{q1, q2}−q1 <
max{q1, q2} − q2, i.e. q1 > q2. Therefore
regu¯(a, s) = regu¯(a′, s) = regu¯(a, s′) = 0 < q1 − q2 = regu¯(a′, s′).
We also have
max
{
regu¯(a, s),regu¯(a, s′)
}= 0 < q2 − q1 = max{regu¯(a′, s),regu¯(a′, s′)}.
According to the minmax regret criterion, the agent would prefer a to a′. This contradicts the assumption
a ≈℘{s,s′} a′. Consequently, ℘ is not minmax regret representable.
So a maximin policy is not necessarily minmax regret representable.
The following lemma identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for a maximin policy to be minmax
regret representable.
Table 1
A maximin policy that has no minmax regret representation
℘ {s} {s′} {s, s′} u s s′ u¯ s s′ regu¯ s s′
a ≈ a′ a′ ≺ a a ≈ a′ a 0 1 a p1 q1 a 0 0
a′ 0 0 a′ p2 q2 a′ 0 q1 − q2
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u :A × S →R such that maxa∈A u(a, s) = 0 for any s ∈ S.
Proof. Suppose ℘ is minmax regret represented by u¯ :A × S → R. Set u to be the value function that is spec-
ified by u(a, s) = −regu¯(a, s) = u¯(a, s) − maxa′∈A u¯(a′, s). By the proof of Lemma 3.1, we know ℘ is maximin
represented by u. It is also clear that maxa∈A u(a, s) = 0 for any s ∈ S.
On the other hand, suppose ℘ is maximin represented by a value function u such that maxa∈A u(a, s) = 0 for
any s ∈ S. We show ℘ is also minmax regret represented by u. In fact, since regu(a, s) = maxa′∈A u(a′, s) −
u(a, s) = −u(a, s), we have
a ≺X a′ iff min
s∈X u(a, s) < mins∈X u(a
′, s)
iff max
s∈X regu(a, s) > maxs∈X regu(a
′, s).
Therefore ℘ is minmax regret representable. 
The above lemma suggests that, in order to characterize minmax regret policies, we need only to characterize
those maximin policies that have a value function u such that maxa∈A u(a, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
The following example gives a clue.
Example 3.2. Suppose S = {s, s′}, A = {a, a′}. Consider the following policy ℘̂ that is specified as follows:
a ≈℘̂{s} a′, a′ ≺℘̂{s′} a, a′ ≺℘̂{s,s′} a. (5)
℘̂ is minmax regret represented by the value function u which is specified by u(a, s) = u(a′, s) = u(a, s′) = 0 >
−1 = u(a′, s′).
Note the two policies given in Examples 3.1 and 3.2 differ only in the local state {s, s′}.
Definition 3.1. A policy ℘ is best-equally strict if, for any pair of states s and t , and any pair of best choices a and b
at s such that a is better than b at t , we have that a is better than b at {s, t}. Or more formally, ℘ is best-equally strict
if, for all s, t ∈ S and all a, b ∈ A we have
a ≈{s} b ∧ (∀c ∈ A)c {s} a ∧ b ≺{t} a → b ≺{s,t} a. (6)
Note that while the policy given in Example 3.2 is best-equally strict, the one given in Example 3.1 is not. The next
proposition gives a characterization of the best-equally strict maximin policies.
Proposition 3.2. For a maximin policy ℘, the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. ℘ is best-equally strict;
2. ℘ is maximin represented by a value function u :A × S →R which satisfies maxa∈A u(a, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
Proof. (Necessity) Suppose ℘ is maximin represented by a value function u such that maxa∈A u(a, s) = 0 for all
s ∈ S. For any a, a′ and any s, s′, suppose a, a′ are two best choices at {s}, and a is better than a′ at {s′}. We now
show a is also better than a′ at {s, s′}.
Since a, a′ are two best choices at {s}, we have u(a, s) = u(a′, s) = 0. Moreover, a′ ≺{s′} a implies u(a′, s′) <
u(a, s′)  maxa˜∈A u(a˜, s′) = 0. Now, by min{u(a′, s), u(a′, s′)} = u(a′, s′) < u(a, s′) = min{u(a, s), u(a, s′)}, we
know a is better than a′ at {s, s′}, i.e. a′ ≺{s,s′} a. Hence ℘ is best-equally strict.
(Sufficiency) Suppose ℘ is a best-equally strict policy that is maximin represented by a value function u. We next
define a new value function u¯ such that maxa∈A u¯(a, s) = 0 for all s ∈ S and show that ℘ is maximin represented
by u¯.
For (a, s) ∈ A × S, define
u¯(a, s) =
{
0, if u(a, s) = ϕ(s);
u(a, s) − k, otherwise
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all (a, s) ∈ A × S.
In order to show that ℘ is also maximin represented by u¯, we need only show the following condition (7) holds
for any local state X, and any actions a, a′.
min
s∈X u(a
′, s) < min
s∈X u(a, s) ⇔ mins∈X u¯(a
′, s) < min
s∈X u¯(a, s). (7)
(⇒) Suppose mins∈X u(a′, s) < mins∈X u(a, s). Take s1 ∈ X such that u(a′, s1) = mins∈X u(a′, s). Clearly,
u(a′, s1) < u(a, s) for each s ∈ X. In particular, by u(a′, s1) < u(a, s1)  ϕ(s1) we know u¯(a′, s1) = u(a′, s1) − k.
For any s ∈ X, since u(a, s) − k  u¯(a, s), we have u¯(a′, s1) = u(a′, s1) − k < u(a, s) − k  u¯(a, s). This means
u¯(a′, s1) < u¯(a, s) for all s ∈ X. Therefore mins∈X u¯(a′, s) < mins∈X u¯(a, s).
(⇐) Suppose mins∈X u¯(a′, s) < mins∈X u¯(a, s). Take s1 ∈ X such that u¯(a′, s1) = mins∈X u¯(a′, s). Clearly,
u¯(a′, s1) < u¯(a, s) for all s ∈ X. We next show u(a′, s1) < u(a, s) for all s ∈ X.
We note that u¯(a′, s1) = u(a′, s1) − k because u¯(a′, s1) < u¯(a, s1) 0. Moreover, for each s ∈ X, we have either
u(a, s) < ϕ(s) or u(a′, s) < u(a, s) = ϕ(s) or u(a′, s) = u(a, s) = ϕ(s).
Suppose u(a, s) < ϕ(s). Then we have u¯(a, s) = u(a, s)−k. Therefore, by u¯(a′, s1) < u¯(a, s), we know u(a′, s1) <
u(a, s).
Suppose u(a, s) = ϕ(s) and u(a′, s) < u(a, s). Then by u¯(a′, s) = u(a′, s) − k and u¯(a′, s1) u¯(a′, s), we know
u(a′, s1) u(a′, s) < u(a, s).
Suppose u(a, s) = u(a′, s) = ϕ(s). Recall that ℘ is maximin represented by u. This means a and a′ are two
best choices of ℘ at {s}. By u¯(a′, s1) < u¯(a, s1) we know u(a′, s1) < u(a, s1), i.e. a′ ≺{s1} a. Since ℘ is best-equally
strict, we know a′ ≺{s,s1} a. This means min{u(a′, s), u(a′, s1)} < min{u(a, s), u(a, s1)}, i.e. min{ϕ(s), u(a′, s1)} <
min{ϕ(s), u(a, s1)}. This is possible if and only if u(a′, s1) < ϕ(s) = u(a, s).
In summary, u(a′, s1) < u(a, s) holds for all s ∈ X. Therefore, mins∈X u(a′, s) < mins∈X u(a, s). 
As a corollary of Lemma 3.1 and Propositions 2.1 and 3.2, we have
Theorem 3.1. A maximin policy is minmax regret (competitive ratio) representable iff it is best-equally
strict.
Note that if ℘ has a strictly best choice at each singleton local state, then ℘ is best-equally strict. In particular,
a deterministic policy is best-equally strict, where a policy is deterministic if X is a total order for each local state
X. This proves the next two corollaries.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose ℘ is a maximin policy such that at each singleton local state {s} the agent has a strictly best
choice. Then ℘ is minmax regret representable.
Corollary 3.2. A determinate policy ℘ is maximin representable iff ℘ is minmax regret representable.
4. Conclusions
Axiomatic approach is the prominent approach for understanding and justifying the rationality of decision criteria.
This paper showed that, unlike what was claimed in [2, Theorem 5, p. 466], there are policies that are maximin
representable, but not minmax regret representable. We then identified a necessary and sufficient condition for
a maximin policy to be minmax regret (competitive ratio) representable, which allows the agent to take
the same value for all best choices at all singleton local states.
Recall that Brafman and Tennenholtz [2] and Hesselink [4] have obtained representation theorems for maximin
policies. We therefore conclude that a policy is minmax regret (competitive ratio) representable if and
only if it satisfies (1) the closure under unions property [2], (2) the acyclicity condition [4], and (3) the best-equally
strictness.
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